Wednesday, July 29, 2015

People vs. Bustamante

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

January 27, 1959
G.R. No. L-11598
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.

FACTS:
1.       Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
2.       The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year late, or on September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting.
3.       The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

ISSUE:
1.       Whether or not the second marriage was valid.
2.       Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority to solemnize the marriage.  As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant to said office.  This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it.  The case even concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting capacity.  The word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character as nature of the same.

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

Angela M. Butte vs Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc

G.R. No. L-15499             February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

1.    Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of Jose V. Ramirez, all his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.

2.    Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. including the undivided 1/6 share  property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of Jose V. Ramirez.

3.    Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.


ISSUE

Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.


HELD

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6 undivided property of Jose V. Ramirez.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

Monday, July 6, 2015

People vs Jansenn

G.R. No. L-31763 December 27, 1929
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. JANSSEN, defendant-appellant.


FACTS :

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Father H. Jansenn to have their name inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done. On December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.
As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to marry them before the date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued a dispensation of the marriage with the understanding that no obstacle has been discovered in the investigation made or to be made of the status and liberty of the contracting parties, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario.
On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued an authority to solemnize marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario.
By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del Rosario.


ISSUE :

Whether or not the defendant-appellant violated section 2 of Act No. 3412

HELD / RULING :

The law does not impose upon priest or ministers of religion to investigate whether the license was issued by an official duly authorized by law, that is, by the municipal secretary of the municipality where the woman habitually resides. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the information, with costs de oficio.