Levy Hermanos Vs. Pedro Paterno

G. R. no. L – 5515

Levy Hermanos Vs. Pedro Paterno

Facts:

1.    Pedro Paterno (defendant) executed a document in favor of Levy Hermanos (plaintiff), indicating that a balance of P6,177.35 will be payable in partial payments.

2.     The defendant made several payments and later claimed to establish the installment of P30.00 per month payment.

3.    The plaintiff disagreed and brought suit and asked that he should be paid the sum of P5,862.35 (unpaid balance) or that a period be specified within which he should pay the same, in case the court should deem such manner of payment more equitable.

4.    During the trial it was agreed by the parties that the sum which the defendant owed the plaintiff was P5,317.35

5.    In view of the evidence adduced during the trial, a monthly payment of P200 would be reasonable compliance with the agreement to pay the debt in installment. The payment will be rendered on or before the 15^th of each month.

6.    The defendant appealed that:

a.    The obligation is one of payment by installment, its fulfillment cannot be required immediately;

b.    No fixed day was specified for its fulfillment;

c.    Payment is undetermined or was not fixed by parties when they executed the contract.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the defendant should pay the plaintiff according to the period fixed by court.

HELD:

            Yes. The trial court acted in accordance with the law in exercising said power by fixing the duration of the period on the basis that the payment of the debt should be made at the rate of P200.00 a month.

There was no abuse of judicial discretion in fixing such a rate, considering the importance of the obligatin and the absence of any stipulation of the interest in favor of the creditor.

Article 1180

Article 1180.   When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the provision of article 1197.

Artikulo 1180. Kapag ang taong may pagkakautang ay ibinigkis ang kanyang sarili na siya ay makakabayad ku8ng ito ay ipahihintulot ng kanyang kakayanan, ang obligasyon ay ipinagpapalagay na mayroong takdang panahon, isinasailalim sa probisyon ng artikulo 1197.

Ø  When the debtor binds himself to pay forms of promise or commitment, the obligation is deemed with a period or term.

Ø  The moment of payment is dependent upon the will of the debtor.

Note:   As the time of payment is not fixed, the same must be first fixed first before any action for collection should be allowed. This means, the creditor cannot immediately file an action for collection of the sum promised to be paid.

Phrases Indicating A Term or Period

1.    A commitment to pay “little by little”

2.    “As soon as possible”

3.    “As soon as I have money”

4.    When the creditor agreed “to wait until such time the debtor could pay the full indebtedness.”

5.    Obligation to be paid “in partial payments”

Article 1171

Article 1171.

Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for the future fraud is void.

The fraud in this article refers to the fraud in the performance of the obligation and not to the fraud in the execution of the contract. It is the intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of the obligation.

Any deliberate deviation from the normal way of fulfilling the obligation may be a proper basis for claim for damages against the guilty party. But the contract itself will remain intact and valid. The problem lies only in the implementation and not in the execution.

Any waiver of any action for future fraud is void. To allow such waiver:

a.    will render the obligatory force of contracts illusory;

b.    parties can simply disregard their commitments without fear and reprisals;

c.    contracting parties will stop being serious with the performance of their prestations.

However, the law does not prohibit waiver of an action for damages based on fraud already committed. After a party has been defrauded, and he wants to forgive the other party, that is his own concern. The law will not stop him.

                                      

G.R. No. L-26339 December 14, 1979

MARIANO C. PAMINTUAN, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and YU PING KUN CO., INC., respondent-appellees.

THE CASE:

This case is about the recovery compensatory, damages for breach of a contract of sale in addition to liquidated damages.

Mariano C. Pamintuan appealed from the judgment of the Court of Appeals wherein he was ordered to deliver to Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc. certain plastic sheetings and, if he could not do so, to pay the latter P100,559.28 as damages with six percent interest from the date of the filing of the complaint.

FACTS:

In 1960, Pamintuan was the holder of a barter license wherein he was authorized to export to Japan one thousand metric tons of white flint corn valued at forty-seven thousand United States dollars in exchange for a collateral importation of plastic sheetings of an equivalent value.

By virtue of that license, he entered into an agreement to ship his corn to Tokyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. of Osaka, Japan in exchange for plastic sheetings and contracted to sell to Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc. for two hundred sixty-five thousand five hundred fifty pesos.

On September 27 and 30 and October 4, 1960, the Japanese suppliers shipped to Pamintuan, through Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd., the plastic sheetings in four shipments for a total of 339,440 yards with an aggregate value of $47,000.

Pamintuan withheld delivery of 115, 290 yards and while the plastic sheetings were arriving in Manila, he informed the president of Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc. that he was in dire need of cash with which to pay his obligations to the Philippine National Bank. Inasmuch as the computation of the prices of each delivery would allegedly be a long process, Pamintuan requested that he be paid immediately.

Consequently, Pamintuan and the president of the company, Benito Y.C. Espiritu, agreed to fix the price of the plastic sheetings at P0.782 a yard, regardless of the kind, quality or actual invoice value thereof. The parties arrived at that figure by dividing the total price of P265,550 by 339,440 yards, the aggregate quantity of the shipments.

After Pamintuan had delivered 224,150 yards of sheetings of interior quality valued at P163,.047.87, he refused to deliver the remainder of the shipments with a total value of P102,502.13, As justification for his refusal, he said that the company failed to comply with the conditions of the contract and that it was novated with respect to the price.

On December 2, 1960, the company filed its amended complaint for damages against Pamintuan. After trial, the lower court rendered the judgment and ordered Pamintuan to pay YU PING KUN CO., INC. P67,174.17 as unrealized profits and P12,282.26 as overpayment, the trial court added (a) P10,000 as stipulated liquidated damages, (b) P10,000 as moral damages, (c) Pl,102.85 as premium paid by the company on the bond of P102,502.13 for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment and (d) P10,000 as attorney's fees, or total damages of P110,559.28.

Pamintuan contended that the buyer, Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc., is entitled to recover only liquidated damages based on the stipulation on the contract "that any violation of the provisions of this contract (of sale) shall entitle the aggrieved party to collect from the offending party liquidated damages in the sum of P10,000 ".

Pamintuan relies on the rule that a penalty and liquidated damages are the same; that "in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary " (1st sentence of Art. 1226, Civil Code) and, it is argued, there is no such stipulation to the contrary in this case and that "liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof" (Art. 2226, Civil Code).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yu Ping Co., Inc. is entitled to recover damages from Pamintuan.

Whether or not Pamintuan committed fraud in the performance of his obligation.

HELD:

Pamintuan's contention cannot be sustained because the second sentence of article 1226 itself provides that “nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor ... is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation". "Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations" (Art. 1171). "In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for an damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation" (Art. 2201).

The Supreme court further hold that justice would be adequately done in this case by allowing Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc. to recover only the actual damages proven and not to award to it the stipulated liquidated damages of ten thousand pesos for any breach of the contract. This view finds support in the opinion of Manresa that in case of fraud the difference between the proven damages and the stipulated penalty may be recovered.

The Court also found that Pamintuan was guilty of fraud because (1) he was able to make the company agree to change the manner of paying the price by falsely alleging that there was a delay in obtaining confirmation of the suppliers' acceptance of the offer to buy; (2) he caused the plastic sheetings to be deposited in the bonded warehouse of his brother and control the disposal of the goods; (3) he overpriced the plastic sheetings which he delivered to the company.

RAYRAY vs. CHAE KYUNG LEE

G.R. No. L-18176            October 26, 1966

LAZARO B. RAYRAY vs. CHAE KYUNG LEE

FACTS:

1.    Sometime in 1952, Lazaro Rayray, a Filipino, and Chae Kyung Lee, a Korean, met in Pusan Korea, they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955 before they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953.

2.  Before the wedding, Chae Kyung Lee obtained the "police clearance" written in Korean language dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage.

3.   On June 30, 1953, Lazaro Rayray proceeded to India and left Chae Kyung Lee, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea.

4.    On October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her the Police Clearance and its translation into English. He then noticed that Chae Kyung Lee was already married, according to said translation.

5.    He confronted the defendant with the contents of the document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.

6.    Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeked the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee.

7.    The lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or not collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the case was heard on the merits.

8.  In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground:  that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad

ISSUE

Whether or not the court could nullify the marriage of Lazaro Rayray and Chae Kyung Lee being contracted abroad.

HELD

Yes, the court could nullify the marriage of Lazaro Rayray and Chae Kyung Lee even if it was contracted abroad.  Lazaro Rayray is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

Bayot vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

The Case

This is a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

The Fact

April 20, 1979, Vicente and Rebecca were married on in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

November 27, 1982, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix in San Francisco, California. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured.

Sometime in1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Rebecca personally appeared before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo while Vicente was duly represented by counsel.

February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.

March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approval of the motion to withdraw the petition.

May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately.

March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot.

 June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

ISSUE

Whether or not the divorce is valid

HELD

Yes. The divorce is valid.

First, At the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.

Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19^th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. 

Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

The Court has taken stock of the holding that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained

Article 26 of the Family Code of the Phlippines

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) 

VALIDATION PROVISION. The Family Code expressly provides that, except for marriages prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38, marriages solemnized abroad and which are valid there as such are recognized as valid here. As a general rule, therefore, the Philippines follows the lex loci celebrationis rule.

            Lex loci celebrationis -  in Latin, is a legal term for a legal principle, of whatever origins, now found in the English Common law, meaning as roughly translated "the law of the land (Lex loci) where the marriage was celebrated", independent of the laws of marriage of the Countries of legal nationality or legal citizenship of both parties, or of the laws of the Countries in which the parties as persons are domiciled for the purpose of Family law, or resident, of whatever definition—and the assumption under the Common law that such a marriage, when lawfully and validly celebrated under the law of the land (Lex loci) in which the marriage was celebrated, unless Statute (or Legislation) or the Common law explicitly provides when certain otherwise lawful and valid marriages must be adjudged otherwise, is and must be presumed and considered also lawful and valid. –Wikipedia-

A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY. The legal effect which may be given by one state to the marriage laws of another state is merely because of comity or because of public policy and justice demand the recognition of such laws and no state is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to laws which are repugnant to its own laws and policy. This is because every sovereign state is the conservator of its own morals and good order of society. Each sovereign state has the right to declare what marriages it will or will not recognize, regardless of whether the participants are domiciled within or without its border and notwithstanding such marriages’ validity under the laws of a foreignstate where such marriages were contracted.

EXCEPTIONS.

A. Below 18 years of age. Under the Family Code, if either or both contracting parties are Filipinos and they are below 18 years of age, their marriage solemnized abroad will not be recognized in the Philippines as valid even if the marriage is valid in the place where it has been solemnized. Our law clearly adheres to the rule that the marrying capacity of the contracting parties is governed by the national law of the party, which is the Philippine law.

            However, if one is a Filipino and another an alien whose national laws capacitate persons below 18 years of age (for instance 16 years of age) to marry, a foreigner can get married in the Philippines even if he is below 18 years of age if he obtains a certificate of legal capacity from his diplomatic mission in the Philippines stating that, in his country persons even under 18 of age can marry.

            B. Bigamous and Polygamous marriages. Though valid abroad, shall likewise not be recognized in the Philippines. A bigamous marriage is committed by a person who contracts a second marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceeding. Polygamy is the act or state of a person who, knowing that he has two or more wives, or that she has two or more husbands, marries another.

            C. Marriage abroad where there is mistake of identity of the other contracting party is also not recognized in the Philippines. This true even if the one who committed the mistake were the foreigner – spouse.

            D. A marriage by a Filipino to a person who is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations abroad, even if valid in the foreign country where it has been solemnized, shall not be considered valid here. If the Filipino is himself the person who is psychologically incapacitated, such marriage is likewise considered void in the Philippines.

            E. Marriage between ascendants and descendants of any degree as well as between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood are likewise not considered as valid here even if such marriages were allowed in the country where they were celebrated. These are void as they are incestuous.

            F. Marriage declared void under Philippine laws for being against public policy will not be considered here even if such marriage are not against public policy or not illegal in the country where said marriage were solemnized.

ARE COMMON – LAW MARRIAGE OBTAINED ABROAD BY FILIPINOS VALID IN THE PHILIPPINES? Article 26 of the family code apparently does not specifically included common – law marriages contracted by Filipinos abroad as one of the exceptions to the general rule that marriages solemnized abroad is generally valid here in the Philippines if valid where they were solemnized.

            However, common – law marriage obtained by Filipinos abroad should not be recognized here. Article 26 clearly uses the word “solemnized” and not “contracted” or “performed”.

            Solemnization means the performance of the formal act or ceremony by which a man and a woman marriage and assume the status of husband and wife.

            Solemnization refers to or implies a ceremonial marriage and not one which was contracted or merely performed by way of a mere agreement of the parties, such as in case of a common – law marriage. Indeed, the formality, namely, the solemnization, inherent in a ceremonial marriage is what primarily distinguishes it from a common law marriage.

SAME SEX MARRIAGE OF FILIPINOS ABROAD INVALID. Public policy in the Philippines mandates that only a man and a woman can marry each other. Article l of the Family Code states that marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. It also states that the contracting parties must be a male and a female. The Family Code is replete with terms and articles clearly indicating that marriage is a heterosexual relationship. Hence, words like “husband and wife”, “father and mother” and “man and woman” are used. Same sex marriage, therefore, is not allowed in the Philippines. If a Filipino contracts a marriage abroad with a person of the same sex, whether such person is another Filipino or a foreigner, such marriage shall not be recognized here.

PROOF OF FOREIGN MARRIAGE. To establish a valid marriage pursuant to the comity provision of Article 26, it is necessary to prove the foreign law as a question of fact and then to prove the celebration of marriage pursuant thereto by convincing evidence. The presumption arises on proof of a marriage in another jurisdiction, that such marriage was performed in accordance with the law of that jurisdiction. If such law of the other state is not pleaded nor proved and for the purpose of determining the validity of the marriage in the said state, the laws of such state, in the absence of proof to the contrary, will be presumed by the court to be the same as the laws of its own state.

ABSOLUTE DIVORSE. Generally, absolute divorce between two citizens of the Philippines is not recognized in the Philippines. Hence, if the contracting parties who are citizens of the Philippines get validly married in the Philippines or anywhere in the world, their status, in so far as Philippines is concerned, as married persons follow them anywhere in the world. They can only sever their relationship as husband and wife if anyone of them has a cause of action to declare the marriage void or to annul the marriage. Divorce initiated by a Filipino is against public policy.

            States recognize divorces of aliens obtained in other states as a matter of international comity. Aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided, they are valid according to their national law. the foreign marital law and the divorce decree must be duly proven and cannot be taken judicial notice of. Our civil law adheres to the nationality rule on the matter of status or legal capacity of a person. This means that as a person shall determine such status or legal capacity.

            If the marriage is between two Filipinos and one of them obtains an absolute divorce abroad after he has been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign country where absolute divorce is recognized, such naturalized foreigner, who was formerly a Filipino, can come back to the Philippines and validly remarry. The nationality rule shall likewise apply to him. Article 26 will not apply but the law of the country where he was naturalized.

PROVING FOREIGN DIVORCE. Will be discussed in the case of Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G. R. no. 155635/163979, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.

FOREIGNER FILING PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording.

Under our laws, the Filipino spouse has to be considered still married to the alien spouse and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just. The Filipino spouse should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to the alien spouse. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

The purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence.

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES. In the event that a Filipino contracts a foreign marriage which is null and void under the laws of the state where it has been solemnized, such marriage shall likewise be null and void in the Philippines. This is so because the first paragraph of Article 26 clearly provides that foreign marriage, to be considered valid in the Philippines, must be valid in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they are solemnized. Accordingly, if the marriage is not valid in the country where it has been solemnized, it is likewise not valid in the Philippines.

           

People vs. Bustamante

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

January 27, 1959

G.R. No. L-11598
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.

FACTS:

1.       Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

2.       The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year late, or on September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting.

3.       The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

ISSUE:

1.       Whether or not the second marriage was valid.

2.       Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority to solemnize the marriage.  As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant to said office.  This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it.  The case even concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting capacity.  The word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character as nature of the same.

Angela M. Butte vs Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc

G.R. No. L-15499             February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

1.    Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of Jose V. Ramirez, all his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.

2.    Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. including the undivided 1/6 share  property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of Jose V. Ramirez.

3.    Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

HELD

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6 undivided property of Jose V. Ramirez.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

People vs Jansenn

G.R. No. L-31763 December 27, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. JANSSEN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS :

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Father H. Jansenn to have their name inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done. On December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.

As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to marry them before the date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued a dispensation of the marriage with the understanding that no obstacle has been discovered in the investigation made or to be made of the status and liberty of the contracting parties, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario.

On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued an authority to solemnize marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario.

By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del Rosario.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the defendant-appellant violated section 2 of Act No. 3412

HELD / RULING :

The law does not impose upon priest or ministers of religion to investigate whether the license was issued by an official duly authorized by law, that is, by the municipal secretary of the municipality where the woman habitually resides. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the information, with costs de oficio.